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I.RECENT CHANGES IN ECONOMICS
Economic knowledge is so obviously inadequate for coping with
society's ills that we sometimes lose sight of the progress that has
been made in recent decades. Thirty or forty years ago the typical
economist was a college teacher, who devoted himself primarily to
speculations on the theory of value, or to the practical problems
receiving public attention—such as the tariff, the property 'tax,
labor organizations, the state of the currency, or the devious ways
of monopoly. The Marshallian synthesis of economic theory was
broadly accepted, and with it the reassuring principle of continu-
ity. Most economists, deploring poverty and monopoly, felt that
the state could alleviate their harsher features; but it was taken
for granted that social change was and must remain gradual, and
that it was not the function of economists to participate in the
political processes of change. The outstanding tool of economic
investigation was marginal analysis, which Ricardo had been the
first to put to effective use. Economic statistics hardly extended be-
yond commodity prices, foreign trade, immigration, banking, and
the security markets. In any event, technical specialists alonewere
supposed to dabble in such matters. Statistical theorywas in a
primitive state, little known, and little used. The warnings ofa
Marx, a Veblen, or a Mitchell that economistswere neglecting
changes in the world gathering around them, that preoccupation
with states of equilibrium led to tragic neglect of principles of
cumulative change, went unheeded. Even Henry L. Moore's plea
for a statistical complement to pure economicswas received with
faint enthusiasm.
Nevertheless, the limited equipment of economists seemedrea-
sonably adequate, as long as events moved in fairly familiargrooves
and instruction of college youth was the main task of thepro-
fession. Even the outbreak of war in 1914 had slight influenceon
the pattern of economic thinking or responsibility untilour own
country entered the struggle three years later. But the war was
only the first of a series of portentous developments, the last of
which is not yet in sight. A single generation has already wit-
nessed two world-wide armed conflicts, countless revolutions, the
rise and fall of great empires, vast upheavals of population and
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trade, marvelous advances in technology, a train of astronomic in-
flations, revolutionary changes in public finance, the severest busi-
ness depression of which we have a definite record, and the spectre
of secular stagnation. In many parts of the world independent trade
unions virtually disappeared. Here they flourished despite internal
strife; social insurance emerged and developed rapidly, and the
hourly wage of labor moved upward in the face of grave unem-
ployment. Still more momentous developments of our time are
the rise and spread of the communist state in continental Europe,
the systematic restriction of free enterprise in the land of its birth,
and the vast expansion of governmental activity in our own coun-
try and elsewhere. Now, a conflict between the rival ideologies of
Russia and the United States is rapidly gathering momentum, and
whatever its outcome the world seems likely to remain in turmoil
for many years to come.
This swift rush of events has flung economics into a position of
prominence which it neither sought, nor was adequately prepared
to assume. In a complex and growing civilization intricate division
of labor is unavoidable. To be sure, economists were not regarded
as proven experts by the community at large. But as economic
problems requiring urgent attention kept coming up, a distraught
citizenry turned increasingly to men who were supposed to be
specialists for precise facts concerning what was going on, for ex-
planations of the course of events, for forecasts of the shape of
things to be, and for aid in devising acceptable solutions.
The most obvious effect of the upsurge in thinking about chang-
ing conditions appears in the economist's tool chest, which now
bulges with devices such as index numbers, sampling theory, cor-
relation techniques, time-series analysis, reference cycles, factor
analysis, income analysis, multiplier technique, statements of
sources and uses of funds, national income accounts, economic
budgets, and econometric models—devices that were unknown or
little used or comparatively crude a mere thirty years ago. Some of
these instruments are still imperfectly conceived, and all need
further testing. But the significant thing is that both the old and
the new instruments are being focused on the workings of our
economic organization. True, the substantive achievements have
hardly begun to meet the hopes or needs of mankind. That they
are, nevertheless, considerable will, I think, be clear to anyone
who would compare what the best-informed economists knew be-
fore World War I with what they know today about national in-
come and its distribution, or about the rate of growth of employ-
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ment and output whether in individual industries or industry as
a whole, or about the nature and forms of competition and monop-
oiy, or overhead costs, or the behavior of wages and prices in prin-
cipal markets, or consumer and business debt, or the income-gen-
erating effects of investment, and so on over a list thatcan be
appreciably expanded. And while deepening concern with actual
conditions has not yet yielded a dependable theory of the work-
ings of the economy as a whole, that concern and nothing elseex-
plains why economic theory broke loose from its Marshallian
moorings; why it moved first in the direction of monopoly and
later in the direction of employment and income flows; and why
the fences that previously separated public finance,money and
banking, labor problems, international trade, and business cycles,
both from one another and from general economic theory, have
crumpled.
II. THE NEED FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
These, in broad compass, seem to me to be the major changes that
have swept over economics in our generation. Economistsare still
of many schools and clash heatedly ona thousand issues. Scientific
craftsmanship is still a relatively rare skill. Notable advancesto-
wards realistic thinking and towards definite knowledge have
nevertheless been made. The turbulence of life has driven the
economist out of his den and forced him to reckon with the chang-
ing economic scene—with mobilization forwar, reparations, for-
eign lending or relief, inflation, depression. Urgent problems of
this character cannot be handled by introspection alone, and they
can be tackled in a spirit of casual empiricism only at the nation's
peril.
The mounting requirements for exact economic knowledge have
given a great impetus to empirical research, and the NationalBu-
reau has participated in this development. The National Bureau
was established1920. Some of its founders were men of affairs;
others were unusual scholars who' had learned their economics
from life as well as print. The groupas a whole included men with
widely dissimilar views on economic and political issues.They
had, however, one aim in common: to substituteas far as possible
fact for conjecture and tested theory for plausible hypothesis,in
order that the world might havea sounder basis for choosing
among the conflicting policies that are constantly being urged.
We have clung firmly to this purpose through theyears. Our pub-
lications have not urged thisor that policy on the nation, but have
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put steadily before the public the results of objective analyses of
fundamentals that underlie the ever shifting issues of the day.
This concern with the workings of economic organization has
characterized the major economic theorists. To Adam Smith the
basic problem was the size of the national income, to Ricardo its
distribution, to Marshall the interaction of demand and supply,
to Wairas the interdependence of prices, to Fisher the level of
prices, to Keynes the level of employment. In the main, the the-
orists have explored these questions from the point of view of the
economy as a whole, rather than of a particular region or industry
or class. This has also been the characteristic approach of the Na-
tional Bureau, although the parts that make the whole meaningful
receive close attention in our studies. Like the theorists, too, the
National Bureau has sought to separate the persistent or repetitive
from the haphazard elements of experience; that is, to establish
regularities of sequence and covariation among economic phe-
nomena. But whereas the theorists have ordinarily speculated on
the basis of only vague knowledge about economic quantities and
relations, the National Bureau has sought to determine the mag-
nitude of the leading economic variables, their characteristic move-
ments over time, and their actual relations to one another. The
ground covered has been smaller, but the findings have been better
supported by evidence.
Of course, this difference in method reflects, in part at least, a
difference in scientific opportunity. Every major theorist from
Adam Smith to Keynes had a lively interest in the conditions of
his time. Some, like Smith or Marshall, had great historical knowl-
edge. Others—like Jevons, Keynes, and Fisher—had a good eye
for statistical methods. Every one of them had some familiarity
with statistical data, made some use of them in his work, and
stimulated others to examine facts. If they did not do so in greater
degree, the reason is partly that the data needed often did not
exist, or were not to be trusted unless subjected to laborious and
time-consuming tests or revisions-a task the single-handed in-
vestigator could rarely undertake. Adam Smith's famous declara-
tion that he had "no great faith in political arithmetic" was not a
hostile or flippant utterance, but a confession by a good scholar
that he could not "warrant the exactness" of the "computations"
at his disposal.
Seldom have the statistical data available to the economist been
gathered to serve a purely scientific purpose. To a very consid-
erable degree, they are by-products of administrative operations
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by government or private enterprises of different sorts. Some
branches of activity are not covered by statistical data at all, either
because they have not yet become matters of social concern or be-
cause they present unusual problems of measurement. Statistical
data often do not become available until a problem—whether it
be unemployment, the length of the working day, or the rate of
formation of new firms__is generally recognized as pressing. This
means that many problems regarded as sufficiently urgent to call
for action must be dealt with on an inadequate basis of fact. 'What
data are available are often hard to compare or combine, and even
when homogeneous may not be available as frequently as is de-
sirable for scientific purposes. Finally, the statistical data with
which the economist must work commonly stop at the surface of
economic life. They record the results of mass activities, but do
not penetrate to the motives that twist and drive the consuming
and producing units of society.
These difficulties have been reduced by the vast extension and
improvement of economic statistics in recent years, but they have
not been swept away. Nor will they ever be in a complex and
rapidly changing world. As a consequence, fruitful empiricalre-
search calls for a combination of qualities that is not yet wide-
spread in economics. Like the formal theorist, the realistic investi-
gator must have the ability to formulate economic concepts and to
think through economic relations precisely. He mustput definite
questions to statistical data, yet be ever ready to reformulate his
questions in the light of accumulating evidence. He must have the
patience to examine with meticulous care the economiccoverage
and representativeness of the statistics that lie at hand; theenter-
prise to seek out remote and inaccessible bodies of information;
the imagination and technical skill to devise appropriate methods
of relating, combining, reducing, or decomposing statistical ob-
servations; the personal industry or the clerical assistanceto carry
through these laborious operations; the commonsense to make full
use of nonquantitative information about commercial markets and
processes; the conscience to test results repeatedly against fresh
observations; the character to scrap results iferror or unconscious
bias is spotted; the fortitude toexpose his materials and methods
to the public's gaze; the wisdom to seek the help of others who
might make his own best efforts obsolete. Thisprocess of construct-
ing an analytical framework, seekingout observations, processing
them, reshaping the framework, seekingout new observations, and
so on, is the continuous and well-tried method of science. If it is
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followed persistently in economics, the results will be cumulative
and a body of scientfic knowledge will gradually take shape.
III. How KNOWLEDGE CUMULATES
That this expression of faith has some basis in experience I think
I can make clear by an illustration. One of the perennial problems
of economic analysis centers around the formation of capital—ot,
as it is now usually called, investment. Different aspects of capital
formation have attracted attention at different times. Without
capital, division of labor is virtually impossible. With it, round-
about processes of production can be started and industrial effi-
ciency increased. This is the aspect of the problem on which the
classical economists concentrated. They realized that incomes were
generated by investing; that a 'revulsion of trade' ordinarily meant
a shrinkage of investment, and that employment suffered as a
consequence. But they paid little attention to these matters, con-
sidering them of minor and temporary importance. Modern econ-
omists, on the other hand, characteristically take for granted the
role of capital in economic progress, and concentrate on the influ-
ence of investment on current employment and income.
Many proposals for mitigating the fluctuations of investment or
raising its level have been advanced in our time, and they have
rested on different hypotheses concerning the underlying process.
Economists have tried to explain the behavior of investment in
terms of variations in construction costs, in terms of expectations
concerning the rate of profit relative to the going rate of interest,
in terms of the demand for consumer goods or its rate of change,
in terms of changes in the money supply, in terms of technological
progress and innovations, in terms of the rate of change in popula-
tion or national income, in terms of policies of government or of
the banking system or of trade unions. Baffled by these diverse ex-
planations and impressed by the instability of investment, some
economists have taken refuge in the hypothesis that investment as
a whole, or at least a very substantial portion of it, is an 'autono-
mous' or 'spontaneous' variable in the economic system. This and
other hypotheses have been able to thrive because our factual
knowledge of investment has been scanty.
The early publications of the National Bureau recognized the
instability of investment, and its great influence on economiccon-
ditions at large. But the "fragmentary and ambiguous" character
of the statistics, as Oswald Knauth summed up the situation in
the early twenties, severely limited analysis. The only branch of
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investment that received systematic attention was construction
work. At first, this was a technical consequence of preparing esti-
mates of national income by industrial divisions. But there was
also a great deal of discussion during the twenties of the possible
use of public works as a balancing factor in the economy. After the
stock market crash of 1929 interest in public works was intensified,
and there was a demand for accurate information on the invest-
ment goods industries in general. Our publications of that period
reflect the great concern over investment, but they reflect also the
inadequate information that existed. In 1929 King estimated the
volume of construction in the United States during 1928 at $7.8
billion. Next year Wolman raised the figure to $g. billion. A little
later Gayer came out with a figure of $13.0 billion and Kuznets
with $15.9 billion. I do not think it a great exaggeration to say
that up to the thirties our knowledge about the volume of invest-
ment in the United States was hardly more secure than was knowl-
edge about the earth's population at the close of the seventeenth
century, when the learned priest Riccioli estimated the "true num-
ber of mankind" to be i,ooo million and the political arithme-
tician Petty put the number at no more than 320 million.
The amount of investment is, of course, a more elusive quantity
than the number of mankind. The latter is mainly a question of
fact, the former involves also difficult questions of concept. An
important step toward clarifying the problem was taken by Wesley
Mitchell in Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting. Mitchell
observed that consumption in any given year was not limited rigid-
ly by that year's income, since a nation could draw on its accumu-
lation from past efforts. But how large was this accumulation? And
what portion of a year's income was typically added to it? To an-
swer the second question Mitchell used the fragile but instructive
estimates by King and Ingalls. To answer the first question he
turned to estimates of wealth by the Bureau of the Census for
1922. After omitting the value of land, he got a total for man-
made appliances that was three to four times as large as the year's
national income. This total, it turned out, included inventories
with a value almost as large as all movable industrial equipment,
and 'furniture and personal effects' of still larger value. Mitchell
therefore concluded that students of business cycles who wish to
follow realistically the investment process cannot confine attention
to buildings, machinery, and public utility equipment; they must
• take account also of consumer durable goods and the additions to
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or drafts upon the nation's vast reservoir of inventories of raw
materials, semifinished products, and finished goods.
Mitchell's analysis was a brief excursion, incidental to another
and larger theme. The same was true of Mills' interesting measure-
ments of the aggregate output of finished durable goods, and of
other more limited efforts by our staff. However, these side ex-
plorations yielded valuable insights into the problem of invest-
ment, uncovered new materials, and suggested new approaches to
measurement. In combination they indicated that knowledge might
be advanced rapidly by a new project concerned exclusively with
investment. When the Social Science Research Council proposed
late in 1932 "a statistical study of the formation of capital during
the 1920'S in terms of commodities and services," the National
Bureau eagerly accepted the invitation and help of the Council.
The investigation was started in January i933, with Simon Kuz-
nets in charge. To this study Kuznets brought, beside his own in-
valuable experience in measuring national income, a full knowl-
edge of the Bureau's earlier work.
What Kuznets sought to do I can convey best, perhaps, by a
paradigm. Imagine a huge vacant lot on which every member of
the gainfully occupied population plies his trade. When a tangible
product flows from economic activity it shows up on the lot; other-
wise, let us say, some token is deposited there. During the course
of a year each of us tears down the pile on the lot as well as builds
it up; we build up the pile by placing there our product, we tear
it down by withdrawing this or that for consumption. At the end
of the year what is left on the lot represents the year's accumula-
tion by the nation, or its investment. If every item on the lot has
a valid price tag attached to it, the amount of investment can be
ascertained by straight addition. What does the investment con-
sist of? It includes, first, all residential buildings, factories, water-
works, roads, bridges, and so on—that is, construction of 'perma-
nent improvements.' It includes, next, tools and machinery, trucks,
tractors, railroad cars, and so on—that is, producers' equipment
in the way of movable durable goods. It includes, third, raw mate-
rials, semifinished goods, and products ready for final use—that is,
inventories of all sorts. These three categories comprise every-
thing on the lot. The sum of their values, nevertheless, will not
measure investment under conditions differing from those I have
envisaged. For if a portion of the stuff produced on the lot was
shipped abroad and no compensating product received in return,
a claim has been acquired against foreign countries and its amount
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must be counted in the year's investment. Any addition to the
stockpiles within households should likewise be included, and
anything that smacks of a capital gain excluded. Finally, I have
assumed that the 'lot' is empty at the beginning of the year, where-
as in fact it is piled high with the accumulations of generations;
hence the value of the pile at the year's start must be deducted to
get the net investment of the year. The magnitude of net invest-
ment is, of course, vital in judging the economic prospects of a
nation in the long run. But to gauge the current activity associat-
ed with the building up of capital, it is desirable to combine the
replacements of structures and equipment with the net additions.
The resulting quantity is the gross investment or, in Kuznets'
phrase, gross capital formation.
I hope this brief sketch has at least identified Kuznets' broad
objective. By the middle of 1934hehad completed a preliminary
investigation, which was published as Bulletin 52.Thebulletin
presented annual estimates of gross investment in the United
States from igig to 1933.Changesin consumer stockpiles were
omitted, except for gross additions of durable consumer goods.
Otherwise, the totals were complete in principle. They included
construction, the flow of durable equipment to enterprises, the
flow of durable commodities to consumers, net changes in business
inventories, and net changes in claims against foreign countries—
each expressed both in current and in constant prices. The new
series, especially the data on inventories, were highly suggestive,
and the results as a whole seemed promising enough to justify ex-
panding the investigation.
One particularly dark corner of the investment problem was the
consumption of capital—more precisely, the value of durable
goods used up in the course of producing commodities and serv-
ices. Solomon Fabricant began work on this baffling subject. A
little later David Wickens joined the staff to try his hand at de-
veloping basic estimates for residential real estate—a great segment
of the nation's wealth largely neglected by economists. In the
meantime Gayer continued his research on public works. Each of
these studies eventuated in an important publication: Gayer's
Public Works in Prosperity and Depression appeared inig5,
Fabricant's Capital Consumption and Adjustment in 1938, and
Wickens' Residential Real Estate in 1941. Long before these vol-
umes saw daylight, some of the leading results were published in
our Bulletin. Of course, the results were available at all times to
the staff, and Kuznets was in a position to profit continuously by
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the work of his colleagues. He made constructive use of the op-
portunity. By adopting Fabricant's measures of capital consump-
tion, he was able to pass from gross to net investment. By adopting
Wickens' data on nonfarm residential building and Gayer's on
public works, he was able to improve his own treatment of con-
struction. But Kuznets did not confine revision to these matters.
On the contrary, he bolstered the authority of his earlier work by
testing and revising every part of his preliminary investigation.
A summary was published in 1937 in National Income and Capital
Formation. The following year, in his monumental volume Com-
modity Flow and Capital Formation, Kuznets demonstrated at
length how a skilled investigator can transform a nondescript
mass of fragmentary data, scattered over hundreds of sources,into
a coherent account of aggregate investment andits major com-
ponents.
The new measures quickly attracted attention, and they have
greatly influenced both economists and men of affairs. It is easy
to see why that happened. Thinking men were much exercised
about the low volume of investment in the 1930's; but they had
only vague and conflicting notions about the actual volume of in-
vestment, or the importance of its leading parts, or the drop of
different categories of investment from the level of the 1920'S.
Kuznets supplied the essential information in a well-considered
analytical setting. He found, for example, that out of every $ioo
of national income during 1919-1935, only $2.40 was devoted to
expanding business plant and equipment. All channels of invest-
ment together absorbed $8.30; the remaining $91.70 was spent on
consumer goods. These remarkable figures, however, give no ink-
ling of the expenditure on replacing capital goods. Since the pro-
vision of replacements is a vital part of the activity of the capital
goods industries, Kuznets set forth also the record of gross invest-
ment—which includes replacements of durable goods as well as
the additions. On a gross basis, investment during 1919-1935 was
19.2 per cent of the gross national product (which exceeds national
income by the amount that gross investment exceeds net invest-
ment). The results can be put this way: out of every $ioo of gross
national product, $8o.8o was expended on ordinary consumer
goods, $3.60 Ofl residential construction; $10.40 Ofl business plant
and equipment, $i.oo Ofl additional business inventories; $3.60 on
governmental plant and monetary stock; $.6o on the foreign bal-
ance. But $9.50 of the $8o.8o spent by households went into dura-
ble consumer goods. If these too are counted as investment pur-
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chases, gross investment comes out 29 per cent of gross national
product.
The new findings by Kuznets and Fabricant inevitably raised
questions about the part played by investment in earlier stages of
the nation's history. If investment averaged only some 8 per cent
of national income after 1919, what was it in the boisterous past?
Was the increase in the government's share of investment after
1919 a new development or merely a continuation of a trend
deeply rooted in social evolution? Was the marked instability of
investment a recent phenomenon or an abiding characteristic of
the capitalist process? These questions, and others like them, are
obviously of first-rate theoretical interest. Being hotly debated in
the late thirties, they were of practical importance as well. But
before specific problems of secular change could be tackled with
any confidence, new information had to be acquired, and this was
bound to prove increasingly difficult as the statistical clock was
turned further back.
William Shaw undertook the task with full knowledge of the
risks, having served previously as Kuznets' associate. After several
years of unremitting labor, he attained what seemed to be good
estimates of the flow of perishable, semidurable, and durablecom-
modities to consumers, of durable equipment to producers, and
of building materials to construction sites—all expressed inpro-
ducers' prices for every year since i 88g and decennially sincei 869.
Some of Shaw's results were released in 1941 in Occasional Paper3,
and the fully documented final report was published lastyear
under the title Value of Commodity Output since 1869. Perhaps
the most important result of this study is the demonstration of
the increasing role of consumer durable goods in the nation's
economy. According to Shaw's measurements, the physical flow of
all finished commodities into domestic consumption increasedat
an average annual rate of 3.2 per cent between 1879 and 1939. The
rate of growth of consumer durable goods was half again as large,
4.7 per cent. As a consequence the share of consumer durables rose
from 9.6 per cent of the value of finished commodities in 1879to
18.1 per cent in 1939. The increase before World War Iwas slight.
The big jump occurred after 1914, and it exceedsany change in
the nation's habits of consumption previously experienced,at
least since the 1870's.
Just as Shaw's research grew out of Kuznets' original study of
capital formation, so Kuznets' later researchgrew out of Shaw's
work. The estimates prepared by Shaw did not of themselvesre-
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veal what portion of national income consisted of investment. Be-
fore that could be ascertained, the estimates had to be transformed
and amplified. Kuznets' efforts in this direction are recorded in
Occasional Paper 6andNational Product since 1869.Itappears
from the new study that about 91 per cent of the output of the
American economy from 1869 to 1938 can be traced to the doors
of consumers. The remaining 9 per cent is the net investment of
the period by government and private enterprise. The govern-
ment's share has been increasing for many years, but more rapidly
since 1919. During the 193o's investment as a whole diminished
to a mere trickle. In the preceding sixty years it had been very con-
siderable by comparison, averaging i 2 per cent of the national in-
come. Not only that, but the fraction of national income added to
capital was nearly constant, decade after decade. It is common
knowledge that family incomes have generally risen over the dec-
ades, and that in any one year the proportion of income saved is
higher for families with large incomes than for families with small
incomes. In view of these facts, the nearly constant ratio of invest-
ment to national income almost certainly implies that the Amer-
ican public accommodated itself in the past to progressively higher
incomes by spending a progressively larger amount out of income
of any given size.
The studies I have just sketched were designed primarily to de-
termine the characteristic magnitude of investment, its division
into major components, and broad secular changes. But the in-
vestigators concerned with these questions were in continuous
touch with our Business Cycle Unit, and made important contri-
butions to its work. Although the great instability of investment
had long been familiar from sample data, the comprehensive sum-
maries by Kuznets and Fabricant provided a check on existing
knowledge and added to its definiteness. Their records demon-
strated that net investment is even more volatile than gross invest-
ment. This was to be expected from ordinary practices of charging
depreciation; but before the results were finally assembled, I do
not see how anyone could have argued with much force that net
investment is positive in years of depression as well as years of
prosperity. Yet, except for the catastrophe of the early 1930's, that
is what the Kuznets-Fabricant figures show. Another basic finding
relates to inventory investment, which according to Kuznets' data
regularly alternates between substantial plus values in prosperity
and minus values in depression. Not only has this segment of in-
vestment conformed with great sensitivity to business cycles, but
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its fluctuations have been so enormous that they account for about
half of the amplitude of the cyclical swings in gross investment be-
tween the two wars, and for more than a fifth of the amplitude of
the cyclical swings in gross national product.
The arresting fluctuations of inventory investment became the
starting point of a special investigation of inventories by Abramo-
vitz. His study of inventory holdings by manufacturers during
business cycles is virtually completed, and a summary will be pub-
lished promptly as Occasional Paper 26.Abramovitz'first task was
to supplement Kuznets' comprehensive annual aggregates by
monthly records of inventories held at many different points in
the system. The evidence indicated that although new inventory
investment by manufacturers tended to move coincidently with
the business cycle, actual holdings of inventories lagged by about
six to nine months; in other words, inventories continued to rise
some months after production had begun to decline, and continued
to fall some months after production had begun to rise. This sys-
tematic lag is a net resultant of widely different circumstances sur-
rounding the holding of distinct classes of inventories—raw ma-
terials, goods in process, and finished goods. Goods in process, for
example, rise and fall in almost perfect unison with output. This
is a technical corollary of the production process itself, as is the
similar behavior of inventories of finished goods made to order.
Inventories of raw materials, on the other hand, lag behind cycles
in output by about four'months; the lag is usually shorter when
the materials are secured from domestic manufacturers or dealers,
and again longer when secured from distant sources or on long-
term contracts. Much the longest lag characterizes inventories of
finished staples sold from stock. When sales decline, manufacturers
as a rule reduce their output promptly; but the reduction is not
sufficient to overtake the decline in shipments, and inventories
therefore pile up for a year or even longer. Clearly, the move-
ments of inventories can be understood only by observing the
technical processes and marketing arrangements that impede here
and facilitate there the efforts of businessmen to adjust their in-
ventories to changing requirements. Abramovitz' great contribu-
tion consists in demonstrating that inventories are not a homo-
geneous mass, that their behavior does not lend itself to aggregative
analysis; but that economic law nevertheless governs the process
of inventory accumulation and decumulation.
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IV. THE PATH AHEAD
Every investigator whose work on investment I have touchedin
these hurried pages has consolidated knowledge at some point,and
broken new scientific ground at another. In this group belong, of
course, many scholars outside the NationalBureau, notably the
economists working on capital formation at the Department of
Commerce. Each investigator has made progress by building on
the work of his colleagues or predecessors—adding new facts,
mending old series, often clarifying concepts, and always trying to
see how the pieces at hand fit together. If somuch has been ac-
complished in a bare twenty years, is it too much to claim that
economics is already assuming, however hesitantly and gradually,
the shape of a body of knowledge cumulating in the spirit of sci-
ence? Everything I have said of the National Bureau's studies of
investment seems to point to this moral and to justify this faith.
And the illustration I have developed is by no means an isolated
one. I could equally well have taken Stigler's recent essay on
Trends in Output and Employment as a point of departure to
illustrate the cumulation of knowledge of industrial productivity,
or the new Technical Paper on bond yields byDurand and Winn
to illustrate the cumulation of knowledge of interest rates, orthe
Technical Paper on a federal financial statement by Copeland to
illustrate the beginnings of what I trust will be a cumulative
process of expanding realistic knowledge of money flows.And if
I followed any one illustration far enough I would surely encom-
pass before long all the others, as well as much of theextensive
research of other economists on which our own work so largely
rests. For the economic process is one whole, and so in the course
of time must become our knowledge of it.
But before this goal can be attained, there is much fundamental
work to be done on limited sectors of the economy—construction
expenditures, consumer outlays, farming, finance, foreign trade,
and the like. Economics is still in its infancy, and must not over-
reach its strength. Preliminary attempts at integration of knowl-
edge won from stubborn facts must nevertheless go on, both for
their own sake and to guide specialized inquiry. Wesley Mitchell's
essay summarizing the findings of our business cycle studies,which
I hope will be published fairly soon, is a significant step in this
direction, and other large efforts at integration and interpretation
of results will follow.
As economics moves forward, many contradictory movements
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are visible on its surface. But the habit of insisting upon evidence
is spreading, and today evidence less often means deduction from
untested premises. Economic models continue to receive hopeful
attention; but mere logical consistency or aesthetic appeal now
counts for less, and performance under test for more, than a gen-
eration ago. Ever widening circles of men are recognizing that a
piece of research whose reliability can be accepted is a great econ-
omizer of human energy. The path ahead of the National Bureau
is clear: We must continue to insist on thorough and realistic
scholarship as we press our closely related investigations of the
workings of economic organization, for we are traveling a road
along which economic knowledge will cumulate.
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